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The Third Shift: the politics of representation and the psychological turn 
 
Abstract 
In the last few years, the situation and experiences of women in academic philosophy – and 
in academia more broadly – have received unprecedented attention.  For feminist 
philosophers, a growing awareness of the problems facing women in the discipline is 
something to be welcomed.  Nevertheless, this paper raises some serious concerns about 
the framework within which these problems are analysed and addressed.  I suggest that the 
currently prevalent approach overemphasises issues of representation, and that it has also 
become preoccupied with psychology at the expense of political and social criticism.   
 
Introduction  
This paper begins from a dilemma.  The best way to describe this dilemma is perhaps 
through a personal reflection.  My transition from graduate student to junior academic in 
philosophy coincided with a marked increase in awareness of the problems facing women in 
the discipline.  Women in philosophy have always known that they faced problems, of 
course; and the Society for Women in Philosophy (SWIP) has existed since 1972 to support 
women in overcoming those problems and to defend the philosophical credentials of 
feminist theory.  But it is only much more recently that concerns over the situation of 
women in philosophy have become truly mainstream among academics and students. 
From the point of view of a woman beginning a career in philosophy, this belated 
recognition of what feminist philosophers have been pointing out for decades – and of what 
women students and staff have long experienced – seemed like an unequivocally good 
thing.  I began to feel slightly more optimistic, and less alone.  But this feeling quickly gave 
way to a growing sense of unease about the shape which the most prominent analyses and 
initiatives were taking.  This produced a political dilemma of a familiar kind.  On the one 
hand, the unease was persistent and seemed to me to have a real basis.  On the other hand, 
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no feminist would want to line up with the defenders of a sexist establishment by attacking 
long-overdue efforts to combat some very real problems.   
This paper is my response to the dilemma.  It is intended as a critique of present theoretical 
and practical approaches to the issue of women in philosophy.  The critique is partly, though 
not purely, a feminist one.  As Black feminists, among others, have long pointed out 
(Crenshaw 1991; Collins 2000; cf. Spelman 1988), there is in any case no such thing as a 
‘purely feminist’ position, simply because women exist in societies that are structured by 
relations of racial and class domination as well as by gender.  Women in philosophy, too, live 
and work in institutions which are shaped and structured by these and other forces.  To a 
large extent, the criticisms I’ll make of the current discussion around the issue of women in 
philosophy may be understood as criticisms of the attempt to treat that issue as an isolated 
‘woman problem’, to be analysed and resolved independently of a broader critique of 
academic institutions and of the forces that shape them.   
It is worth confessing now to some qualms about the very decision to write about the issue 
of ‘women in philosophy’.  It might be simpler if I could share the view that some 
philosophers hold of their discipline, whereby it is a rare bastion of incisive and critical 
thinking, providing a valuable (if underappreciated) service to society; but I cannot honestly 
share that view.
1
  In writing about the situation of women in philosophy, I do not mean to 
imply otherwise: that is, I do not approach this subject with the guiding idea that academic 
philosophy is a wonderful thing, so that to deny women equal access to or enjoyment of it is 
to deny them something precious.
2
  Nor do I mean to endow the issue of ‘women in 
philosophy’ with any special strategic or global importance: wonderful or not, the field of 
philosophy is – in the grand scheme of things – quite tiny.  I write about it – rather than 
writing about women in sport, for example – as a matter of personal and local interest, as a 
woman whose field of study and work is philosophy.  Feminists outside the field – and even 
within it – may feel that they have better things to think about than the plight of women in 
philosophy (or of women in academia, for that matter).  That is fair enough.   
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 I don’t pretend to be able to vindicate this negative verdict on my own field here, though I have defended it 
at length elsewhere (Finlayson 2015).  For present purposes, it must suffice to note that I am not alone: many 
feminists have been highly critical of the discipline of philosophy in its historical and contemporary 
manifestations (see e.g. Dotson 2012).   
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 On this point, see Le Doeuff (2007).   
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The themes I’ll discuss in what follows, however, do not apply only to the issue of women in 
philosophy (or women in academia), but seem to me to be of much wider significance.  In 
particular, I’ll focus on two tendencies.  The first is an attachment to an overly restrictive 
politics of representation.  The second – what I’ll call the ‘psychological turn’ – is an 
increasing reliance on the findings and conceptual vocabulary of experimental psychology.   
 
I. The ‘Woman Problem’ 
Women, it has been said, are like oxygen: in shorter supply the higher you climb.  Academic 
philosophy is a case in point.
3
  This is sometimes dubbed the ‘triangle phenomenon’: at the 
undergraduate level in the UK, for example, men and women are present in a roughly 50:50 
ratio;
4
 by the graduate level, women have dropped away dramatically; at the top of the 
professional hierarchy, they are rarer still.  It is not difficult to begin to name some of the 
factors which help to bring about and maintain this state of affairs (although there are 
significant disagreements – even among feminists and women in philosophy – as to which to 
recognise and which to regard as most significant): the widespread, semi-explicit perception 
that women are less adept at the kind of rigorous, logical thinking prized by the ‘analytic’ 
tradition in particular; a culture in which sexual harassment is thoroughly normalized (while 
those who refuse to put up with it are habitually ostracized); a system of informal male 
patronage and of the belittling of women students and staff; the inadequacy of provisions to 
make academic life compatible with the care-giving responsibilities that still fall most heavily 
upon women.
5
  Women in philosophy know all about these things.  Amongst ourselves, in 
corners of conference rooms and bars and on cigarette breaks, we talk about them like they 
were the weather.    
Of course, the usual ‘innocent explanation theories’ abound: women simply have different 
priorities, have more ‘practical’ minds, prefer to leave academia when they have children, 
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 Philosophy, in fact, seems to have more trouble attracting and retaining women than any other humanities 
discipline (Beebee & Saul 2011).    
4
 In the US, the proportions are already uneven at the ‘base’ of the triangle, with women making up only 
around 30% of philosophy majors.   
5
 Of course, we may still want to ask why philosophy is like this (both in absolute terms and relative to other 
disciplines).  My point is only that the proximate causes of the disaffection and scarcity of women are not – or 
at least, should not be – hard to fathom.   
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etc. (or they are simply worse at philosophy, after all).  Others have done admirable work 
dealing with these sorts of arguments (see e.g.: Beebee & Saul 2011; Hutchinson & Jenkins 
eds. 2013).  I want to avoid duplicating their efforts here, not because I think it is never 
useful to bolster an existing case, but because I resent the expectation that certain cases 
must be presented again and again before we are permitted to proceed to the next point.  
So: I hereby disown any innocent explanation theory of the underrepresentation of women 
in philosophy.  Let me leave it at that.  What interests me here is what comes next.   
Once convinced of the problem’s existence, it is natural to understand that problem as a 
problem of underrepresentation.  After all, the relative scarcity of women in philosophy, 
particularly at the higher levels, is a stark and established fact.  Assuming against innocent 
explanation theories, this scarcity is also a problem (or indicative of one): the environment is 
hostile; the playing field is not level.
6
  From this, it is a small step to the conclusion that 
better or equal representation for women is the goal of feminist action.   
In order to get closer to our objective, however, we will need to understand what is causing 
the problem.  For some contemporary feminists, the persistence of underrepresentation is 
prima facie puzzling: the factors mentioned above – sexual harassment, family-unfriendly 
hours, etc. – though real, and doubtless part of the explanation, may not seem widespread 
or severe enough to drive away so many women; or, perhaps, the persistence of these 
contributing factors may itself be the object of the puzzlement (“Why is there still so much 
dismissive treatment of women in philosophy now, in the 21
st 
century?”).   
Unwilling to fall back upon innocent explanation theories (which deny the existence or scale 
of the problem), and additionally unwilling to doubt the good faith of professedly egalitarian 
colleagues, many feminists have recently seized upon some findings from experimental 
psychology: the stubborn persistence of the underrepresentation of women in philosophy, 
as in other fields too, may be explained – if not solely, then at least to an extent sufficient to 
help dispel the appearance of mystery – by the joint action of ‘implicit bias’ and ‘stereotype 
threat’ (see Saul 2013; Beebee & Saul 2011).  Implicit bias prevents women’s merits and 
achievements from being fully recognised, while stereotype threat inhibits women from 
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 I’ll return to the question of the exact sense in which underrepresentation is held to be problematic (and 
equal representation desirable) in the next section.   
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performing at their best.
7
  We don’t have to say that women are inherently worse at 
philosophy (though we can allow that stereotype threat will sometimes impair their 
‘performance’).  We don’t have to say that the underrepresentation of women is 
perpetuated by bad people, since implicit biases are involuntary and often unconscious.  
And since implicit biases have been found to be present across all demographics (see e.g. 
Raymond 2013, and cf. Goldberg 1968), we don’t have to say that men in particular are the 
source of the trouble.  Thus, it seems, the puzzle is solved – and nobody’s feelings get hurt. 
With both problem and goal identified, and with the hitherto hidden causes of the problem 
located, we may be understandably anxious to get to the solutions: the means and 
measures that promise to bring us closer to the holy grail of equal representation.  Before 
broaching the question of what is to be done, however, I want to take a closer look at the 
analysis I’ve just described.  That analysis will be familiar, I believe, as it is now pervasive 
within academia and, to some extent, outside it.  I have already identified its main 
components: (i) an emphasis on representation, in framing the problem and the goal of 
feminist action; and (ii) a reliance on experimental psychology for a deeper diagnosis that 
might inform the best course of treatment.  We will look at each of these elements in turn.   
 
II. The Politics of Representation 
I’ve sketched what I take to be a currently prevalent approach to philosophy’s ‘woman 
problem’.  On this approach, a great deal of emphasis is placed upon representation.  This 
may seem so natural as to be automatic.  It is certainly in line with the dominant way in 
which feminism appears in the mass media – with its focus on the ‘glass ceiling’, on the 
percentage of women CEOs and members of parliament, etc.  Part of the attraction of this 
framework is its relative simplicity.  Heads can be counted and percentages calculated.  This 
seems to offer a clear measure of progress (or the lack of it).   
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 As most academics are by now aware, ‘implicit bias’ is a category which has emerged from the practice of 
‘implicit association testing’ (IAT), the idea of which is to uncover often-unconscious associations between 
concepts by recording participants’ mental ‘processing speed’ while performing sorting tasks.  ‘Stereotype 
threat’, on the other hand, refers to the reported tendency for members of stigmatised groups to 
‘underperform’ when placed in a stressful or high-stakes environment in which they are also especially aware 
of the negative stereotypes that apply to them (see Steele 2010).   
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While the politics of representation is attractive, it comes with both dangers and limitations.  
The chief danger, it seems to me, is that the formulation of problem and solution in terms of 
‘representation’ may end up saddling us with a brand of feminism which will strike many as 
narrow at best, and at worst, unattractively elitist or ‘top-down’.  There is some logic to the 
transition here: for if the point is to improve representation, and if the place where there is 
most room for improvement is at the top, then perhaps the top is where we should be 
targeting our greatest efforts.  In the case of corporations, after all, the call is for more 
women bosses, not more women interns or secretaries.  In the context of philosophy, 
focusing on the ‘top’ means focusing on the relatively small set of well-renumerated, 
permanent academic posts, and the most prestigious professorships above all. 
This outcome is no inevitable consequence of the choice to make representation central, it 
should be acknowledged.  Notice, firstly, that although representation is typically only 
demanded for positions and institutions regarded as sufficiently desirable to warrant that 
call, those who make the demand need not be committed to a view whereby representation 
is more valuable the more prestigious or privileged the intra-institutional rank at which that 
representation occurs.  As mentioned above, the reason for prioritising the top might be just 
that it is where the women aren’t: it is where we find the greatest absence.  And this 
absence is unlikely to be the greatest in absolute terms: it may be at the very top that the 
proportion of women is furthest from the 50:50 ideal; but it seems likely that this top will 
also be sufficiently small that we will find more spaces to fill – more places where women 
should be – lower down.  Finally, the question of where to direct focus and effort is always a 
practical one.  It depends not only on a determination of what is to be done (i.e. how many 
holes there are to fill), but also on – among other things – a judgement as to what kind of 
intervention will produce the best return on our labours.  Perhaps with these sorts of points 
in mind, many feminists have sought to direct attention to the ‘leaky pipeline’ that leads 
from undergraduate to graduate study, haemorrhaging women along the way (see e.g. 
Calhoun 2009).   
Nevertheless, I contend, an opposite tendency for the gaze to drift upwards, to focus 
especially on what is seen as most prestigious and desirable, is noticeable both outside and 
within academic contexts – if not so much among feminist academics themselves, then 
certainly and markedly among those who interpret and respond to their efforts from 
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management positions or media platforms.
8
  Not all will be troubled to the same degree by 
this sort of thing, of course; and some self-professed feminists may not be very troubled at 
all.  But it is important to note that those who do find it a problem may find it so on partly 
feminist grounds: there is, after all, a substantial and well-established body of feminist 
critique of ‘top-down’ (or ‘trickle-down’) feminisms which holds that these ‘feminisms’ are 
not worthy of the label, since they fail to oppose patriarchy or sexism for all but a few, 
usually already-privileged women (Eisenstein 2013; Jaffe 2013; Penny 2011).  It’s possible to 
question the force of the critique of ‘top-down’ feminism when applied to the case at hand.  
Though it may not work so well with wealth, it might be argued, some things really do 
‘trickle down’.  It is often held, for example, that the presence of successful women at the 
top of a profession will inspire others: the ‘role model effect’.  Some hope that having more 
successful women in philosophy will boost the confidence of junior women, or even make 
them philosophize better; it is certainly claimed that such visible high-flyers can help to 
reduce ‘stereotype threat’ in women and other stigmatized groups (Saul 2013).
9
   
This is not an obviously delusional hope, and it may derive plausibility from introspection: 
perhaps we can think of times in our lives where one or two ‘people like us’ gave us strength 
and inspiration in an otherwise hostile environment.  On the other hand, we can probably 
think of cases where supposed role models and fellow travellers conspicuously did not do 
this.  If the alleged beneficial effects of high-level representation worked in every context, 
well enough to overcome other factors, then we would probably live in a very different 
world – and the critique of top-down feminism would be harder to make.  But we know 
from bitter experience that the presence of a female Prime Minister does not necessarily 
enhance the lives or nourish the political aspirations of women in general, just as the impact 
of sporting heroes – no matter how inspirational – cannot fully survive the closure of local 
swimming pools or the sale of playing fields and public parkland to private developers.  The 
dull-but-essential interim conclusion on the prospects for any genuine ‘trickle-down’ effect: 
it depends – on the context and circumstances in which that effect is supposed to play out.   
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 It is also striking that it seems to be so much easier to get women candidates appointed to prestigious roles 
than to get institutions to take sexual harassment seriously.  This is not for want of attention to the latter issue 
from prominent feminist philosophers.   
9
 It is also thought that exposure to ‘counter-stereotypical’ exemplars may help to reduce implicit bias in 
members of all groups.  I discuss implicit bias and stereotype threat further in Section III below. 
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It might be thought that this context-sensitivity is a feature that attaches specifically to 
instrumental justifications: whether or not X will produce a certain effect is likely to depend 
on the situation in which X occurs.  But increased representation of women in high places 
may also be justified on the grounds that it is self-perpetuating: the presence of women at 
the top helps to promote the presence of more women at (or near) the top.  Here, 
representation sometimes appears to figure as an end-in-itself – and as a means only insofar 
as it is a means-to-itself.  It is also possible to hold that representation is valuable neither ‘in 
itself’ nor instrumentally, but rather insofar as it is indicative of something else that is 
valuable – some ideal of substantive equality of opportunity, for example.
10
  What about 
these other ways of valuing representation?  
Here too, it seems to me, the value of the latter is crucially context-dependent.  Equality of 
representation can neither be simply identified with ‘justice’ (or even ‘equality’), nor 
function infallibly as a yardstick thereof.  A quick thought experiment makes this clear.  A 
world in which women and men are equally represented in philosophy, but where the sole 
selection criterion for women philosophers is their perceived physical attractiveness, seems 
like a world still further from gender equality than our own.  Equal representation, in such a 
scenario, neither constitutes nor indicates equality or justice for women.  Of course, it is also 
true that this kind of scenario corresponds neither to the actual world nor to the vision of 
any would-be feminist reformer.  The point of describing it is just to make vivid two points 
which, though very simple, can sometimes get lost in the rush for improved representation: 
it is not representation as such that is important to feminists; and whether the latter is a) 
productive, b) constitutive, or c) indicative of something desirable, depends on the manner 
and context of its realization. 
This last point might seem rather academic (in the pejorative sense).  I have admitted that 
the context described above, in which women are equally represented without being 
equally treated, is an imaginary one.   Let us therefore now imagine another, somewhat less 
far-fetched scenario: those in positions of power, realising that they must be seen to be 
promoters of gender equality, duly make efforts to ensure that women are better 
                                                          
10
 It is also possible, of course, to value representation in more than one of these ways: e.g. we may think that 
it is both a promoter and a measure of equality of opportunity (which we value).   
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represented at the higher levels of academic philosophy; they do this by employing, in 
effect, an unofficial quota system, giving marginal preference to women applicants for 
certain posts; however, little else – e.g. the epidemic proportions of sexual harassment, 
everyday belittling and undervaluing of women – changes; the women co-opted into top 
roles, let us also suppose, are almost without exception white, well-connected women from 
upper-middle class backgrounds – and, additionally, are consciously or unconsciously 
selected (even more so than is the case with men) for their subscription to values which are 
generally affirmative of the academic-institutional status quo.   
In my view, we are edging towards something more like this imagined scenario than one 
that would constitute a genuine advance for women (even if we have not yet edged terribly 
far towards either).  If and to the extent that this is correct, I suggest, what we are seeing is 
little more than a kind of hyperactive tokenism.  Increased representation, in this context, is 
not best interpreted as an indicator that casual sexism is on the decline, does not 
necessarily mean that women are included on equal terms with men, and while it increases 
(numerical) equality along one axis (i.e. gender), it may – if we are not vigilant – actually 
increase inequality along other axes: e.g. the inequality of treatment and representation 
that exists between different racial groups, people of different class backgrounds, and 
people of different philosophical and political persuasions.
11
   
Far from being pertinent only to the issue of top-level representation, these last points – 
about inclusion on unequal terms, and about the replacement of one kind of inequality with 
another – could apply even to the imagined scenario in which exactly 50:50 representation 
of men and women is achieved ‘all the way down’ the institutional hierarchy.  But I doubt 
that this latter scenario will be realised any time soon – not until the underlying causes of 
underrepresentation are addressed, at least.
12
  What seems to me more likely is that, over 
the next few years, we will see numerically modest but disproportionately visible further 
increases in the representation of women in philosophy at the higher levels, and moderate 
increases elsewhere, leaving the overall ratio considerably short of the elusive 50:50 mark.  
But neither I nor anyone else can make such predictions with certainty.   
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 Cf. Marx’s point, in the Critique of the Gotha Programme, about the inherently abstract and relative nature 
of ‘equality’ as a value (in Marx 2010).  
12
 To say this, of course, is to acknowledge that representation retains some value as an indicator – even if this 
consists mainly in the negative indicative value of underrepresentation. 
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Where does all this leave us? The intended upshot is not that we should give up on talking 
about and valuing representation altogether.  All that I have said here is compatible with 
continuing to place some value on representation, in all three senses: productive, 
constitutive and indicative.  Moreover, by beginning from an observation and critique of the 
fact of underrepresentation, we may be led to other critical insights.  Where, exactly, we are 
led will depend on our particular impressions of academic philosophy, and on our politics 
more broadly.  Most who call for better representation also identify and criticise some of 
the alleged barriers to this goal, such as sexual harassment, or carer-unfriendly scheduling 
of events.  Thus, they make criticisms of academic philosophy which go beyond the bare 
complaint that there are too few women in it.  A consciousness of the fact of 
underrepresentation might even lead us to deeper, ‘structural’ criticisms.  For example, one 
could come to the conclusion that in traditionally patriarchal societies like our own, women 
will gravitate towards the bottom of any hierarchy; the answer, in that case, will be a 
feminist overcoming of hierarchy itself (see e.g. Ehrlich 1977).
13
   
Once we make these further criticisms, however, we already begin to dilute or move away 
from what I have called the ‘politics of representation’: we begin to talk less about 
representation, and more about other things.  And it is crucial that we do so, for only then 
can we be appropriately critical of the institutional status quo.  A break with the politics of 
representation is especially needed if we are to make what I have called ‘structural’ 
criticisms.  Working within a politics of representation, after all, means thinking about some 
group’s presence within, or access to, a pre-given structure which is held fixed for the 
purposes of the exercise; and unless otherwise specified – which would mean stopping 
talking about representation long enough to say something about the structure within 
which representation is to be realized – it may be assumed that the structure in question is 
the one that already exists.   
We may make this last point more vivid by invoking again the image of a triangle – only, this 
time, let us think of the triangle as standing for the institution of academic philosophy itself, 
rather than the tapering portion of women within it.  Academic philosophy, like academia 
                                                          
13
 Of course, part of the task of elaborating and defending such a view – which may be seen as belonging to the 
tradition of ‘anarcho-’ (or ‘anarcha-’) feminism – must be to explain what does and does not count as 
‘hierarchy’ of the kind deemed unacceptable.   
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more generally, is an elite and internally hierarchical institution; so a triangle (or pyramid) is 
a fitting shape to use to represent it.  We may now mentally draw some horizontal lines, to 
indicate the various levels of the professional hierarchy: Master’s, PhD, temporary 
academic, permanent lecturer, professor.  We may then look at the distribution of members 
of different groups within and across the strata – for example, we may shade in a small 
sliver at the top of the triangle to indicate the proportion of women in professorial positions 
in philosophy.  Perfect equality of representation would be depicted by a straight line drawn 
down the middle.  The basic shape and internal structure, however, are not altered: the 
strata, the compartments, remain exactly the same; only (some of) their inhabitants have 
changed.   
If some feminists have tended to over-emphasize representation, it may be that the mistake 
is encouraged by a sensitivity to (one horn of) the dilemma I mentioned at the start of this 
paper.  Because we do not want to accept innocent explanation theories, which effectively 
dismiss concerns which our experience tells us are well grounded, we are drawn towards 
the politics of representation, which offers the most prominent articulation of those 
concerns.  Yet this is not the only available feminist response.  Another possibility, given a 
commitment to women in philosophy, is to look at where the women are, not where they 
aren’t: where is the relevant constituency, and what are its concerns? Since women in 
philosophy (even more so than the men) are mostly to be found in temporary and casual 
jobs, it might make better sense for feminists to begin with the fights against marketization, 
funding cuts and precarity – issues which affect us all,14 and women especially (see Johnson, 
Kavanagh & Mattson 2003: 73).  It would be unfair to suggest that advocates for women in 
philosophy never acknowledge these issues at all.  There are signs that more are beginning 
to do so,15 and this is only to be welcomed.  In general, however, they still get nothing like 
the amount of attention that is given to representation.  One reason for that, I suspect, is 
that such issues are perceived as ‘too political’: they are bound up with more general and 
controversial phenomena and concepts such as ‘neoliberalism’, and they threaten to bring 
feminists into conflict with university management.   
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 This is part of a wider pattern in academia (and, of course, beyond it).  At the time of writing, 54 per cent of 
all academic staff and 49 per cent of teaching staff at UK universities are employed on ‘insecure contracts’ 
(UCU 2016).   
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 For example, in May 2015, a call for papers was issued for a SWIP UK panel focusing on women and 
casualization.  However, the call failed to attract
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The same discomfort with politics, I believe, also underlies the second tendency I wanted to 
discuss here: the enthusiasm for an approach which draws heavily on the findings and 
conceptual framework of experimental psychology.   
 
III. The Psychological Turn 
We have already encountered the concepts of implicit bias and stereotype threat, and 
sketched their place in a currently popular analysis of the problem of the 
underrepresentation of women in philosophy.  It remains to describe the remedies 
proposed on the back of this analysis.  
One of the main recommendations of a 2011 report by the British Philosophical Association 
and SWIP UK is that all academics be made aware of the prevalence of both implicit bias and 
stereotype threat.  Since the phenomena in question are thought to be largely unconscious 
and involuntary, however, it is no surprise that simply telling people about them is not 
enough to make them disappear.  Those influenced by research on these phenomena duly 
recommend a number of further steps: training sessions (often ‘delivered’ by private 
companies) which aim to counteract or eliminate problematic biases; anonymization of 
marking and evaluation processes where possible (to ‘block’ implicit bias); the promotion of 
positive images of women as philosophers, e.g. by putting pictures of successful female 
philosophers on the walls of departments (to ‘break down’ stereotype threat and also to 
reduce implicit bias); encouraging victims of stereotype threat to concentrate, if possible, on 
their membership of ‘social groups that are not negatively stigmatized in philosophy’ — e.g. 
people with good ‘A’ level grades or who are getting high marks for their coursework, 
people who have been accepted onto a good postgraduate programme, or people who have 
won funding for their PhDs (Steele 2010: 170).
16
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 Some of these suggestions might raise a few eyebrows.  The last one, for example – focusing on membership 
of non-stigmatized groups – might seem to imply that a white woman, in order to combat stereotype threat, 
should be advised to think to herself: “Well, at least I’m white.”  A reply here might be that not all ways of 
implementing a piece of advice – not even all effective ways – are acceptable, for any number of reasons.  
Nevertheless, that this account implies even a defeasible reason to draw strength from whiteness seems 
troubling.   
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A number of organisations and initiatives now exist to make sure that the necessary action 
is being taken and progress being made.  The British Philosophical Association (BPA) and 
SWIP UK have produced a ‘Good Practice Scheme’, for example, to which institutions may 
sign up: it is up to institutions to monitor their own progress in implementing the Scheme 
(which features education and action on ‘gender bias’ very prominently), but the BPA keeps 
a central list of participating institutions, and allows them to display the Scheme’s ‘Good 
Practice’ logo.  In a roughly contemporaneous pilot scheme by the ‘Equality Challenge Unit’ 
(ECU) – the organisation which also ‘owns’ the more long-standing Athena SWAN 
programme, which promotes women in the sciences – Gender Equality Charter Marks 
(‘GEMs’) were awarded to humanities departments perceived to be creating better 
environments for women.  Mercifully (given the difficulty in keeping up with the acronyms), 
the ECU’s gender equality charter mark has recently merged with its Athena SWAN Charter.   
A first thing to notice about all this is that the recommendations listed above could not 
easily be classified as proposals for what I’ve called ‘structural change’.
17
  In fact, many of 
them seem positively to affirm and reinforce existing structures and practices – such as 
current funding priorities, the hierarchies of esteem that dictate what does and does not 
count as a ‘good postgraduate programme’, the idea of ‘top journals’, or the practice of 
‘networking’.  A large part of what it would mean for the remedies to ‘work’, we may infer, 
is that they ease the upward passage of women into those hard-to-reach places that are 
often the focus of calls for better representation.
18
 
It is understandable, of course, that women should want to be able to compete on equal 
terms with men for the benefits on offer within the system that we have – even while we 
may also have criticisms of that system (who doesn’t want funding, after all?).  But as we 
have seen, there can also be feminist grounds for wanting to change the system itself (in 
academia as elsewhere).  At the very least, it seems problematic if our feminism is in conflict 
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determining what does and does not count as ‘structural’, and thus for telling us where the reform of 
conditions within a set structure ends and the alteration of the structure itself begins.  Nevertheless, the 
distinction is intuitively accessible: we have no difficulty in knowing that placing pictures on a departmental 
wall is a reform less ‘structural’ than, say, democratizing the internal governance procedures of the university.     
18
 This, however, does not mean that we may measure the effectiveness of these remedies simply by 
monitoring the numbers of women.  As argued above (see Section II), progress toward the goal of equal 
representation could equally well be explained by a concern for ‘image-management’ among those in 
positions of power within academia – a factor which could also account for the enthusiasm, within the same 
quarters, for some currently fashionable means to the realization of that goal. 
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with well-founded demands (whether of feminist or other origin) for structural 
transformation.  Hence we may – again, at the least – want the advocacy of the set of 
measures described above to be coupled with a deeper critique which counter-balances the 
affirmative slant of that advocacy.   
All this is on the assumption that the measures will, in fact, work (on their own narrow 
terms).  But we have some reason to question that assumption.  In the case of implicit bias, 
the biggest problem with the main recommendation – anonymizing hiring and assessment 
procedures – is that the scope for implementing it, in small academic worlds, is fairly 
minute.  People often know each other and each other’s work sufficiently well that they will 
know whom they are assessing, name or no name.  And even when this is not the case, only 
a fraction of the process by which someone comes to be graded or hired (or not hired) is 
such that it is possible or desirable to anonymize it.  As soon as the veil is lifted, any good 
work can easily be undone, by biases implicit and explicit.   
There are also (different) reasons to be pessimistic about the power of interventions 
designed to combat stereotype threat.  Those sceptical about the potential of a few pictures 
on a wall to ‘break down’ stereotypes formed over many centuries are likely to find 
themselves met with examples of various studies, such as those in which subjects’ 
performance is reportedly enhanced after exposure to positive ‘role models’ (e.g. Blanton, 
Crocker, & Miller 2000).  But even assuming in favour of the replicability of these and other 
experiments, to move from this sort of finding to a conclusion about long- or even medium-
term solutions outside of the laboratory context is a leap, to put it mildly.  If you give 
someone a piece of toast, they may be pleased.  If you hand them a hundred pieces of toast 
over the course of a day, they may start running away from you.  If you send someone an 
unexpected greetings card, it might improve their mood, but it probably won’t have this 
effect if you do it every morning.  It is possible that, the first time a woman walks into a 
department and sees a picture of a successful woman philosopher, this may reduce the 
effects of stereotype threat or otherwise give her a boost, a product of this vivid illustration 
that women can succeed in philosophy.  But when every department adds a token woman 
or two to their walls – along with a few gender equality rosettes and awards – some women 
are more likely to get just the bland feeling of depression and alienation that comes from 
encountering yet another self-congratulatory advertisement of how much is being done and 
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how much those in charge care about underrepresented groups, when in actuality, nothing 
much seems to have changed.  From the point of view of those women in philosophy who 
belong to more than one underrepresented group, or stand at the intersection of more than 
one system of oppression, it will also not help matters if the celebrated ‘role models’ tend 
to be overwhelmingly white, otherwise privileged women whose work is largely in line with 
dominant conceptions of what counts as (good) philosophy.   
On the other hand, perhaps I am guilty of being unduly gloomy and of underestimating the 
power of small changes.  It doesn’t matter much if I am, however, because I actually have no 
wish to argue with colleagues who want to promote anonymization where possible, or to 
put pictures of women on the walls.  It is not as if these measures are particularly onerous.  
In terms of time and effort, they are trivial – or rather, they should be;
19
 and I do not need 
convincing that the concepts of implicit bias and stereotype threat correspond (roughly, 
anyway) to real and troublesome phenomena.  In particular, it is not a new discovery that 
the same work tends to be graded more highly when presented as the work of a man than 
when presented as the work of a woman – and that this still occurs when the graders are 
politically progressive, or when they are women themselves.  As early as 1968, a study by 
Philip Goldberg found that female college students consistently rated the same work more 
highly when a male name was attached than where a female name was given (a finding 
echoed by more recent experiments in which participants are asked to evaluate CVs; 
Steinpreis et al 1999; Moss-Racusin et al 2012).  In this context, to anonymize where 
possible seems like basic hygiene.  In any case, some measure of anonymization has already 
been standard academic practice for years, mostly to avoid unfairly privileging of favourites 
or those perceived in advance as ‘good students’.  
So, we should put pictures of women on the walls (if we are going to put pictures of people 
on the walls at all), and we should anonymize when we can (which probably means: slightly 
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 Even these modest demands have often met with a great deal of resistance in practice – at least when raised 
as part of a strategy to promote gender equality (anonymization for non-political or non-feminist reasons may 
be another matter).  However modest and low-cost the proposal, there is always some reason why it would 
create too much work, be somehow counter-productive, or destroy something precious.  Reasons are found 
why feedback should not be anonymised (‘feedback should be personalised’), why more women philosophers 
cannot be put on reading lists (‘quality would be sacrificed’), and the organisation of seminars cannot be 
altered even slightly (‘philosophy is all about the cut-and-thrust’).  The philosophy journal Analysis, for 
example, held out against calls for anonymization for many years, and anonymity is still not the norm in 
science journals.  This does not mean, however, that anonymization (of marking and reviewing procedures 
etc.) is an inherently difficult thing to achieve.    
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more than we currently do).  This should be neither difficult to do nor interesting to say.  But 
I want to say it with a number of caveats.  We should be vigilant against that danger which 
besets all attempts at reform, and minor reforms in particular: the danger that these 
attempts, even or especially if they are successful, may come to serve as decoys, breeding 
complacency and protecting the status quo from meaningful challenge.  We should not 
expect too much to come of these labours.  We should also be wary of throwing too much 
of our time and energy into them: although not much time and energy should really be 
necessary, it is striking how much administrative work has already been generated – with 
much of the burden falling, as usual, upon women.  In this way, women in philosophy are in 
danger of being saddled with a ‘third shift’ (cf. Hochschild 1989): on top of doing their 
academic jobs – which, for many women, already involves a large portion of ‘invisible’ and 
unrecognised work (e.g. pastoral or informal affective labour) – and then going home to 
undertake the bulk of traditionally female tasks such as cleaning, cooking and childcare, we 
may find ourselves sitting up long into the night filling in Athena SWAN Bronze Award 
application forms and drafting ‘action plans’.
20
   
In sum, my practical worry is a) that the measures proposed to combat implicit bias and 
stereotype threat are unlikely to have much positive effect, and b) that, if we make a fetish 
of those measures, encircle them in superfluous bureaucracy, and fail to supplement them 
with appropriate structural critique and corresponding action, they will also be counter-
productive, distracting us from more urgent struggles – chief of which, I believe, is the need 
to resist the neoliberal forces currently reshaping the university
21
 – and adding to the 
existing burdens borne by women in academia.  Underlying this worry is a sense that the 
vocabulary of experimental psychology is an inadequate replacement for traditional political 
and social criticism, and that feminists are therefore in danger of being drawn into a 
position that is both theoretically and practically impoverished.   
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 Sara Ahmed (Ahmed 2004) draws attention to a further danger that seems pertinent here: that ‘admissions’ 
of ‘bad practice’ can come to be counted as signs of ‘good practice’ (i.e. that the mere process of documenting 
and acknowledging problems such as racism, sexism, underrepresentation and sexual harassment is taken as 
evidence that these problems are being dealt with).   
21
 The profile of ‘the neoliberal university’ varies according to time and place.  In the UK at the time of writing, 
it means, among other things: a relatively new model – but one which is being very quickly normalized – of 
students as ‘clients’ or ‘customers’; funding cuts, rising student fees and stagnating or diminishing workers’ 
pay; and the rise of precarious and ‘zero hour’ contracts, for both academic and non-academic staff. 
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To see this, it helps to first outline what I mean by ‘traditional political and social criticism’ – 
although what I mean by it is probably just what readers would expect.  I have in mind here 
the exposition, analysis and critique of the relations of power which structure society.  For 
feminists, this must primarily include the partly hidden relations of power and domination 
that characterise the social reality of ‘gender’.  I also have in mind the analysis and critique 
of ideas.  This latter task often involves tracing those ideas, and the hold they have in the 
society in question, back to relations of power and domination, of advantage and 
disadvantage – the project sometimes known as ‘ideology-critique’.  For feminists, the 
project is to unmask the ‘ideology’ of patriarchy.   
How does the concept of implicit bias stand in relation to the set of traditional tasks and 
objects of enquiry just outlined?
22
 To talk about implicit bias is not obviously to try to 
analyse society and its constitutive power relations.  Of course, many would argue that 
implicit bias and stereotype threat are two of the ‘micro-mechanisms’ through which the 
oppression of women is maintained.  But that does not mean that, in floating this 
hypothesis, they are thereby engaged in the analysis of society and relations of power – any 
more than we would say this of a geneticist who isolates and studies a gene, and then 
suggests that this can explain the fall of successive empires.  To talk about implicit bias is 
also not to analyse or critique ideas, or systems of ideas: to detect an implicit bias is not to 
give any information as to what does and does not count as sexist; nor does it trace ideas to 
interests, or to the distribution of power in society.   
Implicit bias is implicit bias: it names an ‘implicit association’ between two or more things.  
The question, then, is what significance implicit associations have, relative to the set of 
things that feminists characteristically care about.  If we think of this set of things – systems 
of unequal power, domination, discriminatory and oppressive practices and the ideology 
that surrounds and legitimises them – as forming a cluster, then perhaps implicit bias may 
be seen as one element or node within it.  It seems obvious enough that this set of things 
cannot be simply reduced to implicit bias.  Propagating a ‘rape myth’,
23
 for example, is not 
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 For the remainder of this discussion, I’ll consign stereotype threat to the background and concentrate on 
implicit bias.   
23
 ‘Rape myths’ denote a set of beliefs and explanatory habits which effectively blame women for their 
subjection to sexual assault.  For example, it is often suggested that a rape has occurred due to a woman’s 
inebriation or choice of clothing, or that she ‘really’ wanted it (although she did not consent).   
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the same thing as harbouring or propagating an implicit bias – even granted that an implicit 
bias is likely to lurk in the more or less distant vicinity.  Nor is there any obvious reason why 
we should treat this particular element as primary, in a causal or explanatory sense: implicit 
bias seems like something that would be likely to contribute to the underrepresentation of 
women, but so do a lot of other things belonging to the cluster – including relatively explicit 
sexism, and including the deep-seated interest that members of a dominant group 
invariably have in maintaining their dominance.  Equally, implicit biases must surely be seen 
as effects as well as causes – effects, at least in part, of various other elements within the 
cluster we call ‘sexism’ or ‘patriarchy’. 
Notice that all this can be said even without questioning the quality (e.g. the replicability) of 
studies adduced in justification of the feminist focus on implicit bias.  For the sake of 
argument, we may also accept that, contrary to one of the most common objections to 
implicit bias research, the associations detected by computer testing really do indicate a 
prejudice, as opposed to an innocent awareness of the existence of some negative 
stereotype.
24
  Even with this concession, implicit bias can only be one element of the much 
larger object that feminists call ‘patriarchy’.  And if we want to understand and overcome 
the latter, it will not be adequate to think about it in terms of a series of cognitive biases in 
the heads of individuals; phenomena like sexism and racism must be understood as self-
perpetuating social structures.
25
   
So why the heavy emphasis on implicit bias? One factor, I suspect, is the allure of the 
thought that we can ‘objectively’ measure sexism.  What we are really measuring, however, 
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 The usual rejoinder to this objection cites a reported correlation between high IAT scores and 
‘discriminatory behaviour’, which is thought to add plausibility to the inference from those scores to the 
conclusion that the subject ‘endorses’, in some sense, the association that he or she harbours.  The existence 
of this correlation is disputed – a recent meta-study found that IATs were ‘poor predictors of every criterion 
category other than brain activity, and [that] the IATs performed no better than simple explicit measures’ 
(Oswald et al 2013).  Even assuming a correlation, however, it’s not clear that IAT scores are best treated as 
straightforwardly revelatory of sexist or other bias: e.g. suppose that not only those prone to ‘discriminatory 
behaviour’ but many others, too, have implicit biases which result in high IAT scores (perhaps they have these 
associations because they read or think a lot about misogyny, or because they have experienced a lot of 
sexism).  In that case, using IAT scores as a measure of propensity to sexism or to ‘discriminatory behaviour’ 
will be a bit like using a thermometer to gauge UV levels: since the sun produces heat, there is some 
correlation; but it will be very imperfect, and while the information given by the thermometer might be better 
than nothing, it would be unwise for us to fixate on it too much in deciding when to apply the sun cream. 
25
 See Haslanger (2015) for a fuller development of this point. 
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is not sexism or patriarchy, but (at most)
26
 one element within it.  A further factor is the idea 
that implicit bias offers us a practical way forward which a long history of more overtly 
‘political’ argument and critique has so far failed to provide.  I have already expressed my 
scepticism as to the practical promise of the approach based on research into implicit bias 
and stereotype threat.  That approach, I want to add now, has a key feature which, 
according to its adherents, offers an advantage of practicality, but which may in fact be 
counter-productive from the point of view of feminist politics.  That feature is an apparent 
freedom from what is perceived as inflammatory content, a freedom which promises to 
deliver us from confrontation.
27
  To talk about implicit bias is not to talk about, and expose, 
what I’ve called the ideology of patriarchy.  It is not to confront a colleague about why what 
they have said or done is sexist.  Implicit biases, according to the dominant conception, are a 
bit like sexually transmitted infections (or ‘STIs’): they are very common and nothing to be 
ashamed of; sufferers are only deserving of condemnation if they refuse to get themselves 
checked and to take the necessary steps to protect those around them.  The question of 
where implicit biases come from is rarely, if ever, posed.  Perhaps, as with sexually 
transmitted diseases, it is thought better not to enquire.  The tacit assumption, I suspect, is 
that biases are most likely a legacy from bad old days past.
28
  In that case, it may not matter 
much how they got there: the point, for feminists, is that they are perpetuating inequality 
now; and we can put a stop to that by removing or blocking them.  
For those who believe, on the other hand, that sexism is more than a hangover, that it is 
something systematically produced and renewed by societies which oppress women (and in 
which men inevitably benefit, at least in a narrow sense, from this oppression), this ‘block 
and remove’ strategy may seem about as adequate as trying to bail out a leaking ship with a 
teaspoon (cf. Haslanger 2015).  Moreover, an unfortunate side-effect of this framework can 
be to take the heat off perpetrators of casual sexism and to re-direct it onto those who dare 
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 More likely, in my view, is that what is measured is something loosely correlated to sexism (cf. fn.28 above). 
27
 The idea that non-confrontational approaches are more effective is also often justified by reference to the 
results of experiments in psychology.  I will not discuss the relevant research (and the role of appeals to it) 
here, for reasons of space.  I only note the stark difference between this approach to questions of practicality, 
on the one hand, and on the other hand, treatments of these questions issuing from those involved in social 
movements and in explicitly political criticism (one famous instance of the latter being Frederick Douglass’s 
observation that ‘Power concedes nothing without a demand’ (Douglass 1857)).     
28
 This would certainly be in keeping with my reconstructed narrative in Section I, where the continuing 
underrepresentation of women appears as a puzzle only thanks to a perception that Reason has by now all but 
clinched its embrace of egalitarianism. 
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question the wisdom of the ‘War on Bias’ and its preferred strategies.  For while casual 
sexism is not the same thing as implicit bias, it is rarely fully explicit either; and insofar as the 
category of sexism-that-is-not-explicit has come to be slickly identified with notion of 
implicit bias, it is – we are repeatedly reassured – pervasive but blameless.
29
  Anger is 
therefore inappropriate – except, of course, in the case of those who ‘refuse treatment’.  
That includes not only the legions of reluctant or scornful men – who most often get away 
more or less scot free – but also those women who reject the role that it is most often 
assigned to them: organising the training courses, reading and propagating the literature, 
drawing up the applications and the action plans.  Those, that is to say, who refuse to take 
on the third shift.   
 
Conclusion  
I’ve argued that prominent treatments of philosophy’s ‘woman problem’ display two 
regrettable tendencies: an attachment to a politics of representation; and an equally 
limiting attachment to an analysis and programme of remedies based on research in 
experimental psychology.  Neither tendency is wholly without merit.  It can be useful to 
notice and think about patterns of representation.  The concepts of implicit bias and 
stereotype threat, too, are almost certainly related to real and legitimate objects of feminist 
concern.  But I have argued, in the first case, that we should avoid making a fetish of 
representation, especially insofar as this commits us to a top-down form of feminism; and 
that we would do better to focus our attention on the context and circumstances of 
contemporary academia, beginning from an analysis and critique of the worsening 
conditions faced by the majority of women (and men, for that matter) who work there.  
Second, against the psychological turn, I have argued that we should hold onto an 
understanding of sexism and patriarchy as structural phenomena far broader than implicit 
bias; that we should not be seduced by the illusory advantages of ‘practicality’ attaching to 
                                                          
29
 For an exception, see Holroyd (2012).  As someone persuaded of the indispensability of structural accounts 
of phenomena such as sexism and racism, I am actually sympathetic to the general point that these 
phenomena are not best analysed in terms of the blameworthy behaviour of individuals.  I would object only 
at the point where the renunciation of individualistic blame-attribution shades into the idea that oppressive 
structures can be effectively resisted through winning the hearts and minds of those invested in keeping these 
same structures in place. 
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the psychologistic framework, and that we cannot afford to shy away from critique and 
confrontation.  In short, I have argued that feminists cannot afford to dispense with politics.   
What I’ve argued might still be accused of being unduly defeatist, or of promoting inaction.  
A gesture in the direction of critical social theory – ‘structural’ explanations, ‘ideology-
critique’ and the like – is little consolation for feminists who want to see change, and to see 
it soon.  I have not advocated inaction, however.  I have not even argued against the 
adoption of the remedies most commonly proposed.  I have only urged that, alongside the 
implementation of common-sense measures such as anonymization, we should 
unapologetically continue the characteristic feminist projects of the critique of patriarchal 
societies and their supporting ideologies, and that we should not allow ourselves to be side-
tracked by the twin preoccupations with representation and with psychology.   
The willing undertaking of some kind of ‘third shift’ is, I believe, an inevitable consequence 
of a commitment to a principle of feminist self-emancipation: if we do not want or expect to 
be liberated by men, then women must be the agents of their own liberation – and that 
means work.  But it is up to us to decide what kind of work the shift should entail.  And if I 
have my way, feminist revolution will not involve filling in forms.   
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